and seeks to understand why the National Government took over and expanded a scheme previously organized by the National Milk Publicity Council (NMPC). 2 As a background, a number of themes will be explored, mainly economic and political, in order to illuminate a narrative of the policy-forming process and the struggle in Whitehall and Westminster to bring about the optimum legislative and administrative outcome. The provision of school milk may sound uncontroversial but Mrs Thatcher was by no means the first to question its financial and ideological basis. Items for discussion will therefore be persuasion, resistance and compromise.
The literature on policy networks provides a convenient point of departure.
Although it has its centre of gravity in empirical and theoretical studies of the post-1945 period, there are insights that can be drawn upon for the present research. In particular, the dialectic between structure and agency presented by Marsh and Smith is helpful because it suggests a mechanism for understanding the complex and contingent evolution of school milk policies. 3 These authors, in their own study, explain the continuity of agricultural policy in terms of the close relationship forged between the MAF and the NFU during the Second World War, an association which was maintained in peacetime and which influenced the structures of negotiation even when the exigencies of food shortages were long forgotten. As a starting hypothesis, we might similarly see the system of school milk provision between 1934 and 1945 as sitting neatly within the new framework of agricultural corporatism that was emerging at the beginning of the 1930s. Later in the 1930s and 1940s these negotiated structures remained essentially unchanged even when a welfare ethos came increasingly to the fore and lobbyists struggled to have the constituency of statesponsored milk-provision extended.
The prehistory
Milk played only a small part in early experiments with school feeding. 4 The 1906
and 1914 Education (Provision of Meals) Acts and the Education Act (1921) provided a spring board but through to the mid-1920s milk continued to be thought of as a medicinal supplement, along with foods such as cod-liver oil, rather than as an alternative to the solid foods in school dinners. 5 What changed in the 1920s was fundamental. First, there was an increasing conviction that milk was a nutritionally rich and well-balanced food that would help the growth of all children, not just the poor and hungry. This was based upon Harold Corry Mann's milk-feeding of children in controlled conditions in a Dr Barnardo's home in London, along with the work of John Boyd Orr and others in Scotland.
Another consideration here was the contemporary worry about national fitness, which at the time assumed so great a significance that it seemed to demand novel solutions such as the provision of school milk and welfare milk.
Second, the dairy industry, through the vehicle of the NMPC, began providing milk in the school setting on a much larger scale than had hitherto been possible. This started in Birmingham in 1927, soon followed by Liverpool. Voluntary milk clubs did exist before this, especially in London, but now the organizational and persuasive powers of the Milk Council facilitated a major expansion, with a nationwide promotion of the first Milk in Schools Scheme. The milk was served in one-third pint bottles at the standard retail price and therefore was more a matter of convenience for the consumer than a loss-leader by distributors. By 1934 over one million children in England and Wales were involved, a new market of about nine million gallons per annum.
The Milk in Schools Scheme
In 1933 the government began debating the possibility of providing funds to extend the MISS to as many children as possible. Various options were discussed in late 1933. 7 The first was to allow the NMPC to continue expanding its scheme, but that was thought to be impracticable for the reasons outlined above. A second was to put Local Education Authorities (LEAs) under a statutory obligation to provide milk at the same price as the NMPC, but political opposition to that was likely to be strong from ratepayers. The third and, from the outset, the most favoured policy was for the government itself to initiate a voluntary scheme at the low price of a halfpenny per one-third pint bottle, half of the NMPC's current charge. The vehicles for this would be the newly created Milk Marketing Boards. 8 There was a drawback, however, because the milk industry would not benefit in a half-price scheme above and beyond their present situation until twice the number of children became involved. A substantial government subsidy therefore seemed to be inevitable in the short term.
In November 1933 Sir Horace Wilson was asked to chair an InterDepartmental Committee on 'the milk and milk products situation'. 9 His report in December favoured the familiar Treasury formula of matching funding. 10 In other words, the cost of the school milk subsidy would be borne equally by the MMB and the public purse, with payments to farmers being lower than the full wholesale price.
11
The MMB was essentially a farmers' organization and therefore profit-orientated. over two years to subsidize the manufacture of milk into butter and cheese. This was seen to be vital in order to mop up some of the likely surplus. Second, £750,000 over four years would be dedicated to encouraging 'a pure milk supply', because diseases spread by milk, especially tuberculosis, were on the political agenda at this time.
Third, £1.0 million over two years was to be allocated to a milk publicity fund. 15 This was mainly to pay for the provision of milk in schools, offices and factories, and also in time the MMB initiated a publicity campaign that included press advertising, posters, films, milk bars and shop window displays.
16
In the months before the publication of a draft of the Milk Bill on 1 st June 1934, the MAF sought a strong committee to draw up a detailed plan for the publicity monies in the Milk Act and to oversee its implementation. 17 There were problems in finding people who were not in some way tainted by a previous advocacy of school milk. 18 As an interim measure, in April, advice on the way forward was taken jointly 26 They approved the outline of the MISS that was presented to them and the imprimatur of the MAF came a matter of days later for the programme to go ahead. 27 Since the lead in the MISS was taken by the MAF, subsidiary roles were assigned to the Board of Education and the Ministry of Health. The Board reacted slowly because of a dispute with the Treasury over the funding of its separate free milk scheme, and it waited until August to decide on whether to encourage LEAs to adopt the Milk in Schools scheme. 28 After some debate, its Circular, issued in September, took a positive line on the Board's own area of responsibility, milk for necessitous children, and expressed the 'hope that Local Education Authorities will be prepared, in appropriate cases…to provide milk free to children who are found to need it and be unable to pay for it'. 29 The launch in October was not an unqualified success. Advance press statements from the MMB 'were ignored by practically the whole of the press'.
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Elliot's visit to a school on the first day of the scheme was, however, planned as a 'photo opportunity', and this caught the attention of the public, as did radio broadcasts by Lord Astor and Walter Elliot.
The MISS which rolled out in October 1934 immediately reached 2.6 million children in England and Wales, and 300,000 in Scotland, significantly more than the combined total of former NMPC scheme and free milk provision by LEAs under the Education Acts, but less than the planned target. 31 In state elementary schools, 48.7
% of pupils were involved from the outset, rising to 55.6 % in 1938 ( 33 The growing faith in the nutritional and health-giving qualities of milk is part of the explanation for this shift, coupled with lower overheads for the authorities.
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The Extension Acts
The 1934 Milk Act was a temporary measure that was due to run out after eighteen months. It seems that Walter Elliot was initially confident that he would be able to replace it within that period of time by comprehensive legislation that would provide a long-term solution to many of the economic and health-related problems that faced the milk industry. It was with some discomfiture, therefore, that the government was forced to return to Parliament for further extensions in 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939. 35 It was not until the 1944 Education Act that a satisfactory permanent framework for school milk was found.
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The first postponement was caused by Elliot's appointment of a
Reorganization Commission for Milk in February 1935 to review the Milk Marketing
Scheme and make suggestions for improvements. Until this group reported, eventually in November 1936, plans for amended legislation had to be deferred. In the meantime Elliot asked for, and won, Cabinet approval for an extension of the Milk Act, for eighteen months until September 1937. 37 He acceded to a request from the Board of Education to add a clause in the Bill to allow free school milk for poor children, not just those in a bad physical condition. The Board had also wanted to allow special schemes such as milk for the under fives and nursing and expectant mothers but the Treasury refused to underwrite this policy, the Chancellor, Neville
Chamberlain, articulating a 'slippery slope' argument:
There are ideas about now on the subject of nutrition which give rise to serious misgivings in my mind and unless we are careful the development of these ideas may involve serious political risks and possibly unlimited expenditure.
The ideas and their exponents are such, moreover, as to make me apprehensive lest a moderate Government Scheme should rather whet their appetite for more than satisfying the present demands. 38 Despite such negative internal messages in Whitehall, the Milk Reorganization
Commission recommended an increase in the amount of welfare milk, and the White
Paper that followed in 1937 did at least give some hope of implementation, but it was again blocked in the argument about the next extension measure, the Milk (Amendment) Bill and again in 1938 after the failure in parliament of the Milk Industry Bill.
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Getting the Extension Acts passed was relatively straightforward, despite opposition from the Labour Party on the grounds that the government was ducking the need for a radical reform to the milk industry. 40 The sharper challenge came from beyond Westminster. The MMB were angered, for instance, by the 1937 Act because 'it is unfair to expect the dairy farmers of the country to undertake a social service'.
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Their point was that there was now less surplus milk chasing a market, as evidenced by a 20 % increase in the manufacturing price since 1934, and therefore the MISS was relying upon the goodwill of farmers rather than a sound economic argument. The following year, 1938, they did win an increase in the annual government subsidy to the MISS from £500,000 to £750,000. 56 Their emphasis was upon the disease-spreading potential of the milk, especially the risks posed by bovine tuberculosis, and they would no doubt have been conscious of the irony that new consumers were being exposed for the first time to such risk. 57 Their first tactic was to send a deputation of 25 senior medical and public health experts to visit the Ministry of Health in April 1934, 'for the purpose of urging upon the government the need for efficient protection of children from dangers of TB and other milk-borne diseases'. 58 Second, they published a series of reports, in which they stressed the need for the milk to be pasteurized or, if not, then at least Certified or Grade A (Tuberculin Tested). 59 Their 1936 report was especially telling because it was based upon survey data. We will discuss it further below.
There were other lobbying groups, for instance the National Federation of Women's Institutes and the National Conference of Labour Women, also campaigning for cheap milk for children under school age. 60 As a whole, lobbying did pay dividends. In 1936, for instance, Cutforth commented that there had been a 're-orientation of public opinion' and that school and welfare milk had 'come to be regarded by the public mainly as a step towards a healthier nation'. The existence of the MISS had helped but there is little doubt that political campaigning had been instrumental in building the 'steady pressure for the extension of the plan to other groups, such as nursing and expectant mothers and children under school age…as a desirable social service'.
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Resistance and compromise: the Treasury, the Board of Education and the Milk
Marketing Board
The MAF's principal purpose in initiating the MISS was to defuse the distress and anger of farmers over cheap imports of butter and cheese by providing new markets for their liquid milk. Neither the Treasury nor the Board of Education were enthusiastic, and the MMB, which had to administer the scheme, was also cool.
In essence, the Treasury was less sympathetic to the problem of surplus milk than the MAF: 'if… farmers insist on producing more milk, then on their head be it:
the state cannot pay towards any resulting "loss"'. 62 They also foresaw a danger that in two years, at the end of the period allowed for in the Milk Bill, 'public opinion will clamour for continued supplies to children at manufactured rates for ever, and the
[Milk] Boards will say "as you force this on us, you must share it forever"'.
In addition, the Treasury's opening bid was to insist that all 5.7 million elementary pupils in England and Wales should be supplied because, in their view, the MMB could not have sold their surplus milk at the full retail price and so were not incurring any loss in the MISS above the manufacturing price. 63 There was some dispute about this, with A.W. Street of the Markets Division of the MAF claiming that, on the contrary, the Wilson Committee's insistence on matching funding meant that, under prevailing market conditions, the MMB would make less by supplying school milk than they would have done by making butter and cheese. 64 The size of this gap in the balance sheet was unknown because it was impossible to say how much of the milk sold in schools might have been disposed of otherwise. There may have been some substitution at home but this was not measurable, and so could not be included in the equation. 65 To Board and the government'. 67 Therefore, eventually compromises were proposed for the way that the Treasury would recompense the MMB, based upon either reduced flat rates of payment or so-called 'tapered rates'. 68 The latter sought to take into account both the unknown proportion of children who might wish to take school milk and also a discount that the public could reasonably expect on the purchase of milk if the scheme was especially successful. The tapered payment finally agreed was that, on the first 18 million gallons in the scheme, the MMB and the Treasury shared equally half of the loss incurred by selling the milk at half price. After that the Treasury paid 25 %, up to a maximum of 36 million gallons and its overall liability was capped at £430,000.
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The other major player, the Board of Education, was hostile to the compulsory participation of children in any scheme for which they had to pay: 'many parents would object, and we should either have to establish a milk "means test" or else give the milk away to the children whether their parents would pay or not rather than pour it down the drain'. 70 Until a change of policy in 1934, the Board also had misgivings about any extension of the free milk given to school children under the Education Acts: 'if milk free for all, why not boots and clothes free-for-all?'. 71 In this they were supported by the MAF, who warned against likely pressure for providing cheap milk for expectant mothers and children under three years of age. In the MAF's opinion a 'scheme of this sort would give rise to greater administrative difficulties and would trench on the social services and the Ministry suggest that it may be expedient to allocate the greater part of the £380,000 per annum to the cheap school milk proposals so as to avoid greater evils'. 72 The evils referred to here were the administrative and political problems associated with welfare milk, and not the evils of child poverty.
Criticisms, problems of implementation and foci of resistance
During the formulation and implementation of the MISS there were a number of problems, and criticisms were plentiful, sometimes so fundamental that they constituted sites of resistance to the scheme. First among these was the reluctance of the retail milk trade to be involved. In September 1934 a headline in the Daily Herald declared that 'They want more for children's milk. Distributors say grant of £500,000
is not enough'. This was a report that the distributors were holding up the expansion of the MISS because their payments were inadequate. 73 Part of the problem had been that the Central Milk Distributive Committee claimed that they had not been given an opportunity to comment on the scheme by either the MAF or the MMB 74 The trade eventually settled for the price offered in 1934, although their greater militancy later, in 1938, did force the MAF and MMB to offer an increased margin. This particular bargain was struck by William Morrison, who was desperate to save his Milk Industry
Bill from oblivion and also his own political credibility. Its passage in Parliament had been threatened by MPs and peers supporting special interest groups such as the distributors and producer-retailers. School milk and welfare milk in the Special Development Areas of high unemployment were the principal targets of this guerrilla action. 75 Irrespective of politics and deals in London, distributors at the local level were not obliged to supply school milk. The indifference of many is one reason for the geographically very uneven adoption of the scheme. Schools in rural areas were the slowest to join. Sometimes this was due to the available sources not being appropriate, for instance where the local dairymen could not afford to invest in the machinery for bottling at the one-third pint size or they were unable to supply milk of a high enough quality. 76 Sometimes the distribution allowance to retailers was said not to be worth their while where distances were great. 77 Most rural suppliers were small producer-retailers and this group as a whole had a tense relationship with the MMB over a range of issues such as record keeping and the payment of levies. From time to time supplies were withheld in protest and in 1937-38 the political issue came to a head as rural distributors campaigned for a larger distribution allowance. 78 A second and telling criticism of the MISS was that it did not address the real issues of poverty and malnutrition. This was because the milk was still relatively expensive for poor families, even at the subsidised rate of a half-penny per bottle.
The government subsidy was therefore said to be benefiting the higher income groups. Dr T.D. Llewellyn, School Medical Officer of Port Talbot, explained the situation:
The greatest variation in consumption is amongst those children who have to pay for their milk. The twopence-halfpenny is not always available on the Monday morning when the child sets off for school; and one must remember that many of these are children of parents whose family income is such that they fall just outside the scale of income which decides whether the milk is to be given free or not. 79 Related to this was the claim that school milk was subject to the substitution effect. That happened where children were given less milk and other foods at home because they had access to a cheap source at school, with the saving being spent on other members of the family and on non-food items. 80 Another point was that the one-third of a pint a day simply was not enough to make a difference in the nutritional status of the very poorest children. 81 Much has been talked about the supply of a third of a pint of milk to school children as though it were going to solve the question of malnutrition. It is a start and it is something, and that is all that can be said of it. One pint a day might make an appreciable difference, but it is the general standard of living which must be raised if one wishes to raise the standard of nutrition. 83 It is worth noting that some parents and teachers in wealthy areas did not think that the scheme would benefit their children. Cecil Maudslay in 1936 found this to be true of Peterborough, and he complained that 'it does not seem to be universally recognised that the Scheme is designed for all children in grant-earning schools, and not only for poor children'.
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Third, there was a series of criticisms of the structure of the MISS. Its limitation to elementary school pupils was one such, the critics wanting an extension of the cheap (or free) milk principle to children under school age and also to pregnant and nursing mothers. Apart from the additional milk required, this was ruled out because home delivery would have been necessary, adding greatly to the costs. 85 Another comment was that school holidays and weekends were blank periods.
The long summer break was thought to be especially problematic for malnourished children, whose health might be adversely affected. The solution adopted by the NMPC during the operation of their scheme was every July to send a printed reminder around to parents asking them to order extra milk during the holidays. 86 There is no record of how this message was received but, even if parents had accepted it at face value and acted, there was of course no guarantee that children would drink the milk and no monitoring procedure to check their nutritional status before and after the vacation.
Later in the 1930s, some boroughs did provide milk during the holidays, either in schools or in other public places such as parks. 87 This was usually only for children receiving it free on doctor's orders, but in towns such as Rotherham and
Middlesbrough the take-up by children was good. 88 In Glasgow the Local Authority rented four shops as children's 'milk bars' and sold milk in the holidays at the same price as in school. 110,000 handbills were circulated and over 300,000 bottles sold. 89 The additional burden placed on the teacher by the scheme does not seem to have been a major issue, possibly because many had voluntarily run milk clubs under the NMPC scheme that had operated up to 1934. The National Union of Teachers was concerned initially, but their fears were based on a misconception that teachers might be expected to boil the milk before giving it out to the children. 90 The delivery of the milk in bottled form with straws seems to have overcome worries about spillages, leaving only the added responsibility of collecting the children's halfpennies.
A fourth problem was that many children did not like milk and preferred not to join the scheme. A 1934 survey (table 3) asked why children in London did not take school milk. The answers were interesting, although they are only indicative since there is no way of checking the quality of the data and no details have survived on how they were collected. There is evidence that the novelty of school milk wore off quickly and could not be restored, even by trials in 1936 of flavoured milks.
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< table 3 here >
Fifthly, some schools refused to join the MISS because they had become accustomed to using dried milk or patent products such as Cow and Gate Chocolate Milk, and Colact. One estimate in 1935 had as many as five per cent of children provided in this way rather than by a daily bottle delivery. 92 Horlick's Malted Milk was especially popular in rural areas, where the company had conducted 'vigorous propaganda'. Heating apparatus was provided by Horlick's, and many children were said to appreciate the warm drink and also to find the flavour more palatable than that of ordinary milk. For every four tins ordered, one extra was provided free of charge, and this could be used by teachers in any way they wished, such as giving free milk to poor children. 93 Such products were banned by some LEAs when laboratory analyses showed them to be low in milk content.
These criticisms of the MISS and reluctance of some actors to implement it in its original form illustrate the value of the dialectical model mentioned in the introduction. While the availability and consumption of school milk undoubtedly changed views about the practicality and desirability of macro-scale social welfare policies, at the same time the problems of implementation, and particularly the resistance coming from economic and political sites, influenced both the evolution of policy and the nature of the relationship between the policy-makers and the nascent policy network.
The government-sponsored corporatism of the dairy food system in the 1930s empowered farmers and traders to such an extent that they were able in effect to strangle any restructuring that they perceived to be to their detriment. School milk as a policy did change in detail between 1934 and 1940 but its structure owed a great deal to the NMPC scheme that went before, and the post-1940 period also demonstrates continuity.
'Provision of milk for school children': Circular 1437 and free milk
It seems that civil servants were well aware of these five groups of criticisms and the many others that were articulated in one forum or another. Yet, despite the anticipation of the flak that it would have to endure, the Board of Education proceeded with its Circular 1437, 'Provision of milk for school children'. This rather dull-sounding piece of Whitehall bureaucracy, issued to Local Authorities on 5 th September 1934, generated more comment than many such documents. 94 Two of its provisions were especially contentious: the encouragement of free milk and the heat treatment of school milk. 95 Let us deal first with the issue of free milk. This was not a new policy. The
Maternity and Child Welfare Act (1918) and the Education Acts, especially that passed in 1921, had provided in this way for malnourished children in order to enable them to benefit fully from their schooling. Numbers were not large (table 4) and, in a 1934 review of its policy, the Board of Education concluded that maintaining a strict definition based upon malnutrition was no longer tenable. 96 'In the circumstances Lord Halifax has reached the conclusion that the best course is to amend the Act so as to enable local authorities to provide milk, but not other meals, for any poor child, without regard to any question of malnutrition'. On this occasion Whitehall could not be accused of sloth because within days the Board ran into difficulties when the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused to concede that LEAs should be given any new powers that would impact upon Treasury coffers. There were difficulties. On the one hand, LEAs were irritated that the children still had to be certified medically, and this added time and cost to the process of identifying the recipients of the free milk. For this reason, one local politician colourfully called the Circular 'the most stupid piece of departmental policy that has been perpetrated for many years'. 100 On the other hand, the Board of Education was short of vocal political support and felt somewhat isolated in the policy-making community. They admitted in private that:
there is so far no evidence of any very strong body of opinion, either in the House of Commons or outside, that free milk should be available for poor children…Rather contrary to our expectations, the debates in Parliament on the Milk Bill did not produce any attempt to press for powers for local authorities to provide free milk for all children or even for the poor on an economic basis. 101 The President and Parliamentary Secretary decided to 'stand pat' on their position. The standard response given to complaints was that Circular 1437 simply restated the existing policy that free milk should be granted only if a child is medically certified. 102 In reality this was not a regulation that was enforced enthusiastically at the local level. In November 1934 the British Medical Association noted that not all children receiving free milk were seen by a Medical Officer of Health (MOH). 103 It seems that some LEAs used physical education tests, and others employed means tests, with a variety of qualification thresholds.
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Circular 1437 and pasteurization
The second issue that was raised by Circular 1437 was the Board of Education's stress upon pasteurized milk:
The Board desire to urge that in areas where a supply of efficiently pasteurised milk is available, such milk in all cases be provided. In other areas, all possible precautions should be taken to ensure as far as practicable the safety of the supply.
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This innocent-sounding statement, innocent that is to the modern ear, was interpreted by many in 1934 as a discursively loaded salvo in one of the longestrunning battles on food safety. Pasteurization was an anathema to many. 106 Heat treatment generally was seen as an excessive interference with one of the most precious and delicate of natural products, the risk being that it might lose its beneficial qualities. 107 This row had its roots in 1929 when the authorities in Leeds had requested advice from the Board on the standards they should require from the suppliers of their school milk. The reply given was that they should use only pasteurized or Grade A (TT) milk, and this was significant because it amounted in effect to a policy statement. 108 Within weeks, however, the Board had had to qualify this, somewhat defensively:
It is not our practice to insist on any particular quality; we assume that steps will be taken by the Authority concerned to satisfy themselves that it is of good quality. In a recent case, however, in which the Board's advice was asked by the Leeds LEA, the Board, after consultation with the Ministry of Health, suggested that the milk should be either pasteurized or, if raw, should
be of the quality of Grade A (TT). The Authority, however, did not see their way to accept our advice and we were not able to press the matter. 109 Tuberculosis was one of the major health concerns of the interwar period and,
given the proven capability of milk to spread the bovine version of the disease to humans, it is not surprising that the greater availability of milk at schools was regarded with suspicion by some. 110 Although the NMPC claimed that it took great care to avoid tuberculous milk under its scheme, in 1930 it emerged in a Parliamentary answer that no information was available on the grades of milk used.
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The sensitivity of the Ministry of Health to this issue is well illustrated in the policy-development phase for the 1934 Milk Act. Civil servants were wary of the danger of sending Ministry representatives to meetings where they might be exposed to questioning about the health implications of the proposals concerning school milk.
Note, for instance, this comment about a forum organized by the MMB: 'If we send a medical officer, he will probably be asked awkward questions about "safe milk" by the representatives of the College of Physicians and the British Medical Association'.
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The following summary of the situation in July 1934 from the Ministry's point of view is worth reproducing for its pragmatism.
(1) 'No milk can be guaranteed to be "safe" unless it is efficiently pasteurized or boiled.
(2) To insist on pasteurization or boiling would kill the scheme, at any rate in the rural districts.
(3) The present arrangements for the supply of milk to school children by Local
Authorities and the Milk Publicity Council do not require pasteurisation or boiling.
(4) If there is to be any large extension of the present supply, it will be necessary to do without any universal guarantee of safety and to leave it to the local MOH to see that only the best available milk is supplied'.
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Under the NMPC's scheme, some head teachers and local MOsH insisted on approving the source of milk but most of them lacked the time and resources to check for disease or contamination. 114 From 1934 this was made a formal duty, although there was confusion in the Board of Education about who should take the responsibility. At first they identified the School Medical Officer, but this was later changed to the Medical Officer of the local Sanitary District. 115 The arrangement was enforceable because the MMB refused to pay rebates unless the source was approved. 116 In some rural areas the relevant certification authority was the County MOH, who may have had little previous contact with certain schools and who was often based in a town physically remote from both the school and the source of supply. or efficiently pasteurized, no education authority will be able to give such a guarantee. The responsibility of an authority providing milk is indeed no light one; for should it become possible to prove illness in any child from the taking of that milk, the authority would probably be held liable unless it had taken every reasonable precaution to provide a safe supply.
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In 1935 it transpired, however, that the MMB had no power to impose upon MOsH the duty of approving the source and quality of milk supplied to schools. This was the advice given to the government by its legal officers.
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The MMB itself refused to insist upon pasteurized milk even where it was readily available, because, drawing its identity and authority from the farming community, the Board was well aware of the strong opposition that would come from the legions of small producer-retailers to any requirement to invest in expensive equipment. 121 There is evidence of pressure from the NFU upon the MMB to maintain this position. provided the means to implement a standardised scheme throughout the country, and the MISS that unfolded was in effect a public-private partnership. The previous scheme of the NMPC was informally nationalized, although there were no shares to purchase and no compensation to pay. From 1934, Whitehall was the prime mover and the MMB replaced the NMPC as the organizer.
Returning to the theory of policy networks, the Marsh and Smith dialectical model is helpful. 131 It shows that structure and agency cannot be conceptualised separately because there are interactive relationships between the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the network and the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome. Our discussion of the economic background, the robust debates within Whitehall, the lobbying from outside bodies, and the many criticisms that were levelled at school milk, all suggest a policy that was far from being pre-determined in its outcome but, once the structural features of school milk provision were established, they were resilient. Government initiated the scheme of 1934 but later they found it difficult to change, as the collapse of 
